Description
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Published: 2026-06-10
Score: 9.1 Critical
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

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Remediation

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History

Wed, 10 Jun 2026 17:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Wed, 10 Jun 2026 15:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Roxy-wi
Roxy-wi roxy-wi
Vendors & Products Roxy-wi
Roxy-wi roxy-wi

Wed, 10 Jun 2026 14:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Title Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body
Weaknesses CWE-639
CWE-862
CWE-863
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-06-10T16:31:33.373Z

Reserved: 2026-05-12T17:48:47.879Z

Link: CVE-2026-45550

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-06-10T16:24:57.365Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2026-06-10T15:16:36.160

Modified: 2026-06-10T19:37:41.437

Link: CVE-2026-45550

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-06-10T15:30:15Z

Weaknesses