Description
Relyra is a strict-by-default SAML 2.0 Service Provider library for Elixir and Phoenix. Versions 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result. The XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete as :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes. A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID could be accepted as {:ok}. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0.
Published: 2026-06-18
Score: 9.1 Critical
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
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Remediation

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Tracking

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7 Relyra SAML SignatureValue not cryptographically verified -> authentication bypass
History

Mon, 22 Jun 2026 16:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Sun, 21 Jun 2026 09:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Sztheory
Sztheory relyra
Vendors & Products Sztheory
Sztheory relyra

Thu, 18 Jun 2026 21:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Relyra is a strict-by-default SAML 2.0 Service Provider library for Elixir and Phoenix. Versions 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result. The XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete as :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes. A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID could be accepted as {:ok}. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0.
Title Relyra SAML SignatureValue not cryptographically verified -> authentication bypass
Weaknesses CWE-287
CWE-347
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-06-22T15:51:42.595Z

Reserved: 2026-05-30T02:43:33.107Z

Link: CVE-2026-49454

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-06-22T15:51:10.767Z

cve-icon NVD

No data.

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-06-20T22:55:42Z

Weaknesses