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Thu, 25 Jun 2026 20:30:00 +0000
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ssvc
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Thu, 25 Jun 2026 06:30:00 +0000
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Jellyfin
Jellyfin jellyfin |
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Jellyfin
Jellyfin jellyfin |
Wed, 24 Jun 2026 18:45:00 +0000
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| Description | Jellyfin is an open source self hosted media server. Prior to 10.11.10, a specifically crafted MKV file containing forged filename tags can be leveraged to exploit missing path sanitization during playback. Jellyfin treats the MKV file name tag on MKV attachments as trusted and passes it unsanitized into Path.Combine(attachmentFolder, fileName) inside PathManager.GetAttachmentPath. Because .NET's Path.Combine neither normalises .. nor rejects a rooted second argument, a crafted MKV can redirect Jellyfin's MKV attachment extraction to any absolute path on disk. This triggers on any playback action of the affected video on a client which will attempt to burn in the subtitles by default.g This vulnerability is fixed in 10.11.10. | |
| Title | Jellyfin: Potential MKV attachment filename path traversal to RCE | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 | |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-25T20:00:30.296Z
Reserved: 2026-05-28T14:33:01.178Z
Link: CVE-2026-49246
Updated: 2026-06-25T20:00:27.944Z
No data.
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OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-25T06:15:15Z