RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv
rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least
header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used.
However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad
field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen:
payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt)
- RXE_ICRC_SIZE
This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even
if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring
header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a
packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size()
negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users.
Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length
required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) +
RXE_ICRC_SIZE.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Tracking
Sign in to view the affected projects.
No advisories yet.
Tue, 16 Jun 2026 15:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | NVD-CWE-noinfo |
Mon, 01 Jun 2026 17:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
Sat, 30 May 2026 11:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
cvssV3_1
|
Thu, 28 May 2026 02:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-190 CWE-364 |
Thu, 28 May 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-191 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Wed, 27 May 2026 20:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-190 CWE-364 |
Wed, 27 May 2026 14:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE. | |
| Title | RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-14T17:50:11.647Z
Reserved: 2026-05-13T15:03:33.094Z
Link: CVE-2026-46043
No data.
Status : Analyzed
Published: 2026-05-27T14:17:23.743
Modified: 2026-06-17T10:52:57.227
Link: CVE-2026-46043
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-17T23:45:13Z