The defect is a trusted-domain redirect, not a privilege bypass: the attacker gains no read/write access to pgAdmin or the victim's database, but the redirect launders the attacker's destination through pgAdmin's URL, which raises the success rate of credential-phishing follow-on against the victim.
Fix introduces a same-origin _is_safe_redirect_url helper and gates every MFA redirect that consumes user-supplied 'next' values through it. The helper allows only relative paths and absolute URLs whose scheme is http(s) and whose host matches the current request host; it rejects external hosts in absolute and protocol-relative form, non-http schemes (javascript:, data:, mailto:), userinfo tricks (http://localhost@attacker/), and backslash variants that some browsers normalize to forward slashes. Unsafe targets fall back to the internal browser index. A dedicated regression test exercises each accept/reject category and the original reporter PoC.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.0 before 9.16.
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Wed, 24 Jun 2026 20:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Pgadmin
Pgadmin pgadmin 4 |
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| Vendors & Products |
Pgadmin
Pgadmin pgadmin 4 |
Mon, 22 Jun 2026 15:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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Fri, 19 Jun 2026 12:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
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threat_severity
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Fri, 19 Jun 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Open redirect in pgAdmin 4's multi-factor authentication flow. The MFA validate and register endpoints honoured the user-supplied 'next' query/form parameter without confirming the target pointed back inside pgAdmin, so an authenticated victim who clicked /mfa/validate?next=<external> -- a link typically delivered by phishing -- would be sent to an attacker-controlled host directly out of the trusted auth flow. The defect is a trusted-domain redirect, not a privilege bypass: the attacker gains no read/write access to pgAdmin or the victim's database, but the redirect launders the attacker's destination through pgAdmin's URL, which raises the success rate of credential-phishing follow-on against the victim. Fix introduces a same-origin _is_safe_redirect_url helper and gates every MFA redirect that consumes user-supplied 'next' values through it. The helper allows only relative paths and absolute URLs whose scheme is http(s) and whose host matches the current request host; it rejects external hosts in absolute and protocol-relative form, non-http schemes (javascript:, data:, mailto:), userinfo tricks (http://localhost@attacker/), and backslash variants that some browsers normalize to forward slashes. Unsafe targets fall back to the internal browser index. A dedicated regression test exercises each accept/reject category and the original reporter PoC. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.0 before 9.16. | |
| Title | pgAdmin 4: Open redirect in multi-factor authentication flow via unvalidated 'next' parameter | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-601 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: PostgreSQL
Published:
Updated: 2026-06-22T14:39:56.925Z
Reserved: 2026-06-11T20:40:09.111Z
Link: CVE-2026-12049
Updated: 2026-06-22T14:39:50.698Z
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-06-24T20:30:04Z