| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| WordPress Ultimate Addons for Beaver Builder 1.2.4.1 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to gain unauthorized access by exploiting the social media login form functionality. Attackers can submit a POST request to the admin-ajax.php endpoint with the uabb-lf-google-submit action, a valid administrator email address, and a valid nonce to obtain session cookies and authenticate as that user. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| WooCommerce 7.1.0 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code by injecting shell commands through the product-type parameter. Attackers can send requests to the class-wc-meta-box-product-images.php endpoint with unsanitized product-type values to write malicious PHP files to the web root. |
| JTL Shop versions 5.2.0 through 5.7.1 contains a server-side template injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject malicious template syntax due to unsanitized user-supplied input passed to the Smarty template engine. Attackers can exploit this flaw to read sensitive server-side values such as database credentials and encryption keys, and on versions 5.4.0 through 5.7.1, leverage registered Smarty modifiers including unserialize and file_get_contents to write a webshell to the web root and execute arbitrary commands as the web server user. |
| The Webmin HTTP server (miniserv.pl) allows unauthenticated attackers to impersonate any user with a configured SSL client certificate by sending a forged HTTP header. A remote attacker can spoof certificate DNs and authenticate as any user. Fixed in 2.641. |
| The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Electronic Protest Docketing System (EPDS) and Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) Electronic Docketing System (EDS) does not authenticate password change requests to the '/update-profile/N' API endpoint. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could change an arbitrary user's password. |
| SiYuan before v3.6.1 fails to sanitize package metadata and README content in the Bazaar marketplace, allowing malicious package authors to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript. Attackers can achieve remote code execution on any user browsing the Bazaar by embedding XSS payloads in package displayName, description, or README fields, exploiting Electron's nodeIntegration setting to execute OS commands. |
| Worksnaps before version 1.6.20260201 contains hardcoded cloud credentials and related secret material in the Worksnaps client application binaries. The exposed credentials included AWS access keys, S3 bucket names, and related cloud access information. The originally exposed AWS credentials authenticated as the AWS account root identity and provided access to Worksnaps production cloud resources, including S3 buckets containing sensitive data such as screenshots of user desktops. An attacker with access to the affected client binaries could extract or recover the credentials and use them to access affected Worksnaps cloud resources. |
| Backpropagate is a Python library for fine-tuning large language models on a single GPU. In versions 1.1.0 and 1.1.1, the optional Reflex web UI exposes a training control plane without authentication: dataset upload, model load, training start/stop, multi-run orchestration, GGUF export, and HuggingFace Hub push. The CLI accepts two operator-facing flags intended as security controls: --auth user:pass — documented as "require HTTP Basic authentication on every request to the UI." and--share — documented as "expose the UI on a public address; requires --auth." When --auth user:pass is passed, the CLI prints Auth: enabled (user: <username>) to confirm to the operator that authentication is active, then exports BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH=user:pass to the subprocess that launches the Reflex backend. The Reflex backend (backpropagate/ui_app/**) never reads BACKPROPAGATE_UI_AUTH. No authentication middleware is registered. No request-level guard runs. No WebSocket upgrade guard runs. Any client that reaches the bound port — local or remote, depending on whether --share is used — has full UI access. An inline comment at backpropagate/cli.py:1217-1218 in the v1.1.0 source documents the gap: "For Phase 1 the variable is exported but Reflex doesn't read it yet." This comment was internal-facing; the user-facing documentation (README, CHANGELOG, SHIP_GATE) advertised the contract as enforced. An attacker who reaches the bound port can read uploaded datasets, trigger arbitrary training runs against any local base models as well as read their paths, trigger HuggingFace Hub pushes and cause disk-fill DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0. If developers cannot immediately upgrade to 1.2.0 run backprop ui with no flags so it binds to localhost, use SSH port-forwarding (ssh -L 7860:localhost:7860 <training-host>) instead of --share for remote access, and audit any host previously launched with --share, re-issuing any HF tokens used during those sessions. |
| The shell tool command allowlist in the SecurityPolicy of OpenHuman desktop agent through 0.54.0 (default Supervised security policy) can be bypassed to execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the desktop user. Two flaws in src/openhuman/security/policy.rs combine: (1) is_args_safe() blocks the find flags -exec and -ok but not the functionally identical -execdir and -okdir, which also execute an arbitrary command for each matched file; and (2) skip_env_assignments() strips leading inline KEY=value environment-variable assignments before allowlist validation, so a command such as GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF=<cmd> git diff is validated as the allowed git diff but, when executed via the shell, runs <cmd> through git's environment-driven hooks (for example GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF or GIT_SSH_COMMAND). Because the sandbox is the primary trust boundary between untrusted LLM-processed content and the host operating system, an attacker can achieve remote code execution via indirect prompt injection: a malicious document, email, calendar event, or web page ingested by the agent instructs it to run a benign-looking allowlisted command, resulting in arbitrary command execution, data exfiltration, arbitrary file read/write, and lateral movement on the user's machine. The issue was fixed in commit 60050aa09a870f53ed7e4cd40ed41fd2860329e7 (first released in 0.54.22-staging; first stable release 0.56.0), which blocks -execdir/-okdir for find. |
| Python StateMachine versions 3.0.0 before 3.2.0 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by supplying malicious SCXML documents containing crafted `<data expr="...">` attributes evaluated unsafely. The SCXMLProcessor passes attacker-controlled expression strings through a call chain ending in Python's built-in eval() without sandboxing, enabling arbitrary code execution in the context of the hosting process. |
| picklescan before 0.0.33 contains an incomplete deny-list that fails to block pydoc.locate and operator.methodcaller functions, allowing attackers to bypass security checks. Remote attackers can craft malicious pickle files using these unblocked functions to achieve arbitrary code execution when the pickle is deserialized. |
| picklescan before 0.0.33 fails to block the ctypes module, allowing attackers to achieve remote code execution by invoking direct syscalls and accessing raw memory. Attackers can craft malicious pickle files using ctypes.WinDLL to load kernel32.dll and execute arbitrary commands, bypassing sandbox protections and gadget chain detection. |
| picklescan before 1.0.4 contains an incomplete blocklist for the profile module that fails to block the module-level profile.run() function, allowing attackers to achieve arbitrary code execution via exec(). Attackers can craft malicious pickle files calling profile.run(statement) to execute arbitrary Python code while picklescan reports zero security issues. |
| NVIDIA Spatial Intelligence Lab's (SIL) GEN3C contains an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the inference API server where the /request-inference and /seed-model endpoints deserialize raw HTTP request bodies using Python's pickle.loads() without authentication or input validation. Attackers can supply a crafted payload containing a __reduce__ gadget to the inference API port to achieve remote code execution as the inference process. |
| Nur-Alam39 bus-ticket (no released versions; latest commit 459cabdbeb99c00225b26e46e3c2c30ae1de7bad) contains an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in bus_info.php. The busid parameter received via HTTP POST is concatenated directly into a MySQL query (select * from bus_info where id=$busid) without sanitization, escaping, or parameterization, and in a numeric (unquoted) context. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL — for example a UNION-based payload such as busid=-1 UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6 — to read arbitrary data from the bus_service database. The application connects to the database as the MySQL root account with an empty password, increasing the potential impact. The query is executed via mysqli_query(), which does not permit stacked (semicolon-separated) statements. |
| claudiopizzillo PIAF-HMS (PBX-In-A-Flash Hotel Management System; no released versions, latest commit 389d2633441b65ced1c104212cd62be2bfca21e5) contains multiple unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerabilities. The application has no authentication mechanism and passes user-supplied HTTP parameters directly into deprecated mysql_query() calls via string concatenation, without sanitization, escaping, or parameterization. Affected sinks include rooms.php (DELETE FROM Rooms WHERE ID = $_GET['ID'], unquoted numeric context), checkuser.php (WHERE Ext = '$_GET["Ext"]'), ec.php (date/extension parameters in a WHERE), checkin.php and wakeup.php ($_POST values into INSERT statements), bills.php ($_POST fields built into a WHERE clause), and rates.php and checkout.php. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL to read, modify, or delete arbitrary records in the backing database (e.g. rooms.php?ID=1 OR 1=1 deletes all room records). Note: queries run via the legacy mysql_* extension, which does not permit stacked statements. |
| An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the generic opaque token validation path (validateOpaqueToken) of googleapis/mcp-toolbox.
When verifying an unparsed opaque token via an OAuth 2.0 introspection endpoint (RFC 7662), the toolbox decodes the response into an introspectResp struct where the Active field is declared as a pointer to a boolean (*bool). The code only explicitly rejects a token if the response contains a populated active field set to false (if introspectResp.Active != nil && !*introspectResp.Active). If an introspection endpoint responds with a payload that completely omits the mandatory active key, the internal variable remains nil, causing the conditional check to short-circuit. As a result, Toolbox accepts authorization tokens missing the "active" field, granting access to protected tools and underlying data sources. |
| An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the generic opaque token validation path (validateOpaqueToken) of googleapis/mcp-toolbox.
When the toolbox validates an opaque token via an OAuth 2.0 introspection endpoint (RFC 7662), it decodes the response into an introspectResp struct. However, the subsequent claim-checking logic (validateClaims) evaluates the issuer condition as if a.issuer != "" && iss != "". If the external OAuth provider's introspection response omits the optional iss (issuer) field completely, the variable iss defaults to an empty string. This causes the conditional block to evaluate to false and be skipped silently. Consequently, the application accepts tokens issued by unauthorized or unintended third-party identity providers. |
